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Introduction 
In the 2009 Japanese general election， the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered 
an unprecedented， overwhelming defeat， and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
acquired administrative power for the first time since it was established in 1996. Since it 
was formed in 1955， the LDP had retained its power for 38 years. In the 1993 general 
election， the LDP lost its majority in the Lower House， and as a result it lost administrative 
power for the first time since it was founded. Even during the period that the LDP was the 
out party，合omAugust 1993 to June 1994， the LDP kept its status as the first pa此y.The 
second pa抗yat that time was the Japan Socialist Party (JSP)， which was estab!ished in 
1945， but the party held only about one third of the seats that the LDP held. 
At the end of June 1994， the LDP retumed to power， mainly because of a split among 
coalition parties in power. At that time， the LDP formed a coalition govemment with the 
JSP and the NPH (New Party Harbinger; in Japanese， Shinto Sakigake)， which was 
founded in 1993. The prime minister of that coalition govemment was Tomiichi 
Murayama， the pa付yleader of JSP at that time. Since then， the LDP had remained in 
power. The DPJ was established in 1996. Its main pu中osewas to acquire administrative 
power by defeating the LDP， and it had gradually expanded its support among Japanese 
voters. At last， the purpose of the DPJ was accomplished in the general election of 2009. 
百lee1ectora1 change was a consequence of electoral reform in the Lower House 
election in 1994. The centerpiece of the electoraI reform was the abolition of the Multi目
Member District system and the in仕oductionofthe Mixed System. Therefore， we need to 
examine these electoral systems and election results. In this paper， 1 wi1l examine these 
matters in the Japanese case. 
1. Electoral systems and party systems (in general) 
1.1. The relationship between electoral systems and party systems 
An elecrtoral system and a pa抗ysystem are strongly related. An electoral system is 
an influential determinant factor on a pa均， system. According to a proposition by the 
French political scientist Maurice Duverger (1954)， the single memher plurality system 
(SMP) favors two-party systems and one鴨partygovemments， and the proportional 
representation (PR) system favors mutli-party systems and coalition govemments. In 
addition， he asserted two effects of electoral systems， the mechanical effect and the 
psychological effect. In the mechanical effect， for instance， SMP systems are bound to 
result in fewer parties in parliament. In contrast， the psychological effect is seen in the fact 
that a vote for a smaller party is a wasted vote and therefore people are less inclined to 
bother voting for them. As a result， the vote share of smaller parties is reduced. 
However， the pa均Isystem also influences the electoral system. In general， countries 
with a two-party system tend to prefer the single-member plurality system， and countries 
with a multi-par句rsystem favor the proportional system or mixed systems. The USA and 
the UK， which have traditional two-party systems， have thus retained these systems for a 
long time. In the UK， a referendum for or against introducing a new electoral system-
called the altemative vote system-was conducted in May 2011. The top two parties， the 
Conservative pa町 andthe Labour pa吋y，objected to the electoral reforms and wanted to 
keep the SMP. The result ofthe referendum was to reject the new system， sothe SMP is 
mai-ntained in the UK. (1) 
It can be asserted that the SMP promotes the two・partysystem， but it cannot be said 
that it inevitably brings about a two-party system. In fact， several coutries that have 
adopted it cannnot be c1assified as having a two-party system. In the former India， one-
party dominant system had been retained for a long time. The determinants for the party 
system are not only the electoral system but also the social structure， political culture， and 
so on. In addition， distortion ofthe votes-seats ratio can occu汀 inthe SMP. In the UK after 
World War 1I，the top parties have always been advantaged by the SMP， and third parties 
have always been disadvantaged by it. For instance， inthe 2001 UK election， the top 
party， the Labour party， acquired 62.7 percent ofthe total seats， whi1e itgainedjust 40.7 
percent of the total votes and a third party， the Liberal Democrats， acquired on1y 7.9 
percent of the total seats， whi1e itgained 18.3 percent of the total votes. A hung parliament 
occuηed in the elections of February 1974 and Labour won with minority in the 
parliament. As a result， the Wi1son cabinet was remarkably unstable. Therefore， the SMP 
does not guarantee govemment stabi1ty. 
As in the UK and India， ifthe 
(1) As Hague and Harrop wrote，“Despite its antiquity and simplicity， the p1urality system is becoming 1es 
common. lt survives principaly in Britain and British-influenced states such as Canada， various Caribbean 
islands， India and the United States." (Hague and Harrop， 2010， 182). 
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voters to vote on two separate occasions. If no candidate gains the required number of 
votes in the first round， then a second round of voting occurs. France uses this system in 
both the parliamentary and the presidential elections. In the first part of the twentieth 
cen同ry，many European countries passed a two-round stage for parliamentary elections. 
The system has gained a certain popularity in a number of post-Soviet bloc states 
Belarus， Kyrgystan， Tajikistan， and so on. Albania， Hungary， and Lithuania have 
incorporated two欄roundsystems as a part of their mixed systems. Of the countries that 
have adopted the presidential system， many countries use the two-round system in the 
presidential elections. The idea that the presidency requires a majority ofvotes lies in this 
fact. Evidence from the two-round system suggests electoral仕endsthat are strikingly 
similar to those for SMP. 
On the whole， the systemic consequences of two-round systems are simi1ar to those 
of the SMP. Smaller pa討iesare disadvantaged by the highly disproportional results of the 
system. For instance， inthe 1997 French election， the vote share ofthe National Front was 
14.9 percent， but it gainedjust one seat. Parties with a good geographical concentration in 
support tend to do better. However， it is not apparent that the two-round system favors the 
two-party system because many parties tend to run candidates in the first round， sothat 
may obstruct the two-party system. The systemic consequence of the altemative vote 
system is similar to that of the two-round systems. 
Proportional Representation tends to lead to a multi-party system. The degree of 
party企agmentationdepends on the social structure and the specific variation of the PR 
system. The elements ofthe variations ofthe PR system are minimum electoral thresholds， 
electoral formulas， and dis仕ictmagnitudes. An electoral threshold is a cut-off point 
designed to reduce the number of tiny， splinter parties in a PR tier. As David M. Farrell 
pointed out，“The list systems often contain features which give an in幽builtadvantage to 
larger parties. Tt is common for the electorallaw to include a legal threshold below which 
parties are not awarded any seats"(Fa汀el，2001，81). The higher the cut-off point， the more 
difficult it is for small parties to acquire a seat. It is well-known that a threshold of 5 
percent has prevented smaller parties from acquiring seats and has contr 
-3-
Of the countries using PR， the proportionality of election results in new democracies is 
usually lower than that in old democracies. The reason is the lack ofprevious elections加
recently established democracies. The lack derives party leaders of any realistic prospect 
for gaining seats， sothat many small parties run in the elections and many of them are 
unsuccessful(Farrell， 2001，165). 
Bo白色eSMD and the PR systems have serious defects. A serious defect of the SMD 
is the distortion between vote share and seat share， while that of the PR is the lack of 
constituency representation. In response， a mixed system was designed to offset the 
defects ofboth. As Farrell described it，“For a long time， this category of electoral system 
was associated with just one country-(West)Germany "(Farrell， 2001，97). In the 1990s， 
the mixed system was introduced in many countries， including Italy， New Zealand， and 
Japan. According to Fe汀ara，Herron and Nishikawa， 40 states used the system at the 
national level during the period仕om1990 to 2004 ; this figure constitutes more than 20 
percent of the world (Ferrara， Herron and Nishikawa， 2005). Many of the “New 
Democracies"also adopted the mixed system. We can thus say that an “explosion of the 
mixed system" occurred in the 1990s (see Table 1). Almost al ofthe mixed systems are 
composed of由eSMD and the PR. By definition， a mixed-member electoral system 
incorporates the composition of different systems， sothe mix of the MMD and PR isalso 
classified as a mixed system. Stil， almost al of the mixed systems are composed of the 
SMD and PR systems. Therefore， the existence of the SMD tier tends to promote the 
generation of two m可orparties or two blocs of parties. 
As mentioned above， ingeneral， distortion between vote share and seat share is fairly 
high in the SMD system and extremely low in the PR system. Therefore， the 
proportionality of the mixed system mainly depends on the proportion of the elected 
members who are in the PR tier. The higher that proportion， the higher the degree of 
proportionality. That proportion differs greatly by country. For instance， the proportion of 
the PR tier comprises half ofthe total seats in Russia， but it is only fifteen percent in South 
Korea. Generally speaking， the lower the proportion of the PR tier， the more difficult it is 
for smaller parties to acquire seats in parliament. 
In Germany， New Zealand and Bolivia， the mixed system in use may actually be 
classified as a 
1.2. DisproportionaU砂 andeffective number of parties by electoral 
systems 
In Table 2， disproportionality refers to the index of disproportionality designed by 
Michael Gallagher. The Gallagher index is derived as follows: square the vote-seat 
differences for each p釘ty(ignoring ‘others') ， sum the results， divide the total by two， and 
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Table 1 Mixed systems 
Year Percent Dual candidacy 
Country lntroduced PR Two-votes'? allowed '? 
Albania 1997 26 Yes Yes 
Andorra 1993 50 Yes 。
Armenia 1995 21 Yes Yes 
Azerbauan 1995 20 Yes N。
Bolivia 1996 48 Yes Yes 
Croatia 1995 63 Yes ? 
Ecuador 1979 90 Yes No 
Geogia 1992 64 Yes Yes 
Germany 1949 50 Yes Yes 
Guinea 1991 67 Yes N。
Hungary 1990 54 Yes Yes 
Italy 1993 25 Yes Yes 
Japan 1994 37.5 Yes Yes 
Lithuania 1992 50 Yes Yes 
Mexico 1963 40 Yes Yes 
New Zealand 1993 46 Yes Yes 
Philippines 1995 20 Yes N。
Russia 1993 50 Yes N。
Senegal 1992 58 No ? 
Seyshell 1993 26 No ? 
South Korea 1994 15 No No 
Taiwan 1992 30 No N。
Thailand 1997 20 Yes N。
Tunisia 1993 12 No Yes 
Ukraine 1997 50 Yes Yes 
Venezuela 1993 50 Yes Yes 
Source: Rose (2000). Percent PR in Japan was updated by the author. 
tak:e the squ紅eroot. The higher the figure the greater the disproportionality， orin other 
words， the lower the figure the greater the proportionality. For instance， suppose that the 
vote share of each party is Green 40 percent， Red 30 percent ， Blue 20 percent， and Orange 
10 percent， and that the seat share is Green 60 percent， Red 30 percent，B1ue 10 percent， 
and Orange 0 percent. In this case， the figure of disproportionality is 17.32. If al parties 
have a seat share equal to their vote sh釘e，then the figure of dispropo此ionalityis zero. 
Naturally enough， the average figure of the SMD countries was the highest of the 
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Table 2 Disproporoonality by electoral systems 
昨1ean median max 円11n st dev case N 
SMD 13.24 13.97 26.27 2.0 6.98 10 
PRb 4.09 3.72 9.86 0.24 2.53 30 
MIXED 9.95 10.31 14.19 7.0 2.45 6 
Source: Farel (201) p.157-159， Table 7.1. 
a Gallagher index of disproportionality. 
b Germany ， Bolivia and New Zealand were clasified as PR countries. 
Table 3 Efective number of parties by electoral systems 
町1ean median 打1ax 打11n stdev N 
SMD 2.59 2.46 4.72 1.31 0.97 13 
PRa 4.58 4.10 10.83 2.10 2.04 34 
MIXED 4.36 3.43 9.10 2.46 2.09 9 
Source: Farel (2001) p.157-159， Table 7.1. 
a Germany， Bolivia and New Zealand are clasified as PR countries. 
three categories， and therefore a characteristic of the SMD system was low 
proportionality. In addition， the standard deviation was relatively high. In contrast， the 
figures for the PR countries was low， and therefore the high proportionality of the PR 
system was recognized here. Of the electoral formula of PR， the largest remainder Hare 
system of calculation has re1atively high proportionality， but the d'Hondt system indicates 
relatively low proportionality. According to Farrell， the mean values of disproportionality 
are 2.13 in LR Hare countries and 4.96 in d'Hondt countries (Farrel1， 2001， 161). The 
disproportionality of the mixed system was in between the SMD and the PR. In genera1， 
the proportionality of the mixed systems was not high. 
Evaluating the number of parties is a dificult task， but an index of the effective 
number of parties designed by Laakso and Taagepe1'a isuseful. The index is derived as 
fol1ows: one divided by the sum of the squa1'ed pe1'centage of seats for each pa均
1'ep1'esented in parliament. Table 3 lists the effective number ofparties by electoral system. 
In the S1¥但)countries， the effective numbe1' of parties and the standa1'd deviation were 
1'elatively small. It is thus supposed that SMDs cont1'ol the企agmentationofparties. Ofthe 
thirteen SMD coun白色s，themaximum figu1'e isfo1' lndia (4.72) and the minimum figure is 
for Mali (1. 31)， which has adopted the two-round system. Fo1' other countries using 
majoritarian e1ectoral systems， the figure was relatively low (Australia 2.46， France 3.20). 
The nature of a majorita1'ian system is the1'efo1'e similar to that of the SMP with regard to 
白eeffective numbe1' of parties. 
The coun仕iesthat used the PR system tend to have a high figure for the effective 
numbe1' of parties (mean 4.58). The PR eleto1'al system favors a multi-party system， 
gene1'al1y speaking. Howeve1'， there is a b1'oad 1'ange of figures. The mean for countries 
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that use mixed systems was similar to that of the PR countries. This results can be 
understood as a consequence of the electoral system. However， we can say that the 
countries with multi-party systems favor mixed electoral systems， sothe effective number 
of parties in these countries was relative high. The mixed-system countries， were 
moderate with regard to disproportionality， although they were similar to the PR countries. 
Figure 1 plots the 48 liberal democratic countries by the index of disproportionality 
and the effective number of parties. The correlation coefficient between the two is‘0.281， 
so the correlation between disproportionality and effective number of parties was weak. 
On the whole， the degree of disproportionality is only a weak deterrninant of the effective 
number of parties. However， every countries with an index of disproportionality above 10. 
00 was below 4.00 for the effective number of parties. 
1 think that the power altemation between the two major parties in the 2009 Japanese 
election was a cosequence of electoral reforrn excecuted in 1994. One of the electoral 
reforrns was to introduce a mixed system as the Lower House electoral system. Thus， 1 
wiU now artempt to examine the relationship between the electoral system and election 
results in contemporary Japan. 
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2. Brief hisωry ofthe J.ψanese electoral systems (the Lower House) 
Japan has adopted the parliamentary system， not the presidential system. The 
Japanese parliamentary system adopts a bicameral system composed of the Upper House 
(the House of Counci1ors) and the Lower House (the House of Representatives). Every 
member of the two chambers was elected by voters. As a whole， the Lower House is 
superior to the Upper House. Therefore， the most important national election in Japan is 
the Lower House General Election. 
Here， 1 wi1 explain the history of the electoral systems used for Lower House 
elections. Japanese national elections began in 1890 under the Meiji Constitution. At that 
time， the main electoral system was the S1佃 system.In1900， the Multi-Member district 
system (MMD)， inother words， the Single Nontransferable Vote System， and the Large-
Sized Dis仕ictSystem， were introduced， and in 1919 the SMD was adopted once again. In 
1925， Japan introduced non-restrictive elections， for only males and the MMD， inother 
words， the middle-sized district system. It was primari1y composed of企'omthree to five 
member-elected dis甘icts.The theoretical baseline for acquiring a seat was calculated as 
follow. 
Theoretical baseline = N of total votes..;- (N of elected members + one) 
The theoretical baseline for acquiring a seat was 25 percent in the three-member 
dis佐icts，20 percent in the four-member di柑icts，and 16.7 percent in the five-member 
dis仕icts.In reality， the minimum baseline to win is lower than the theoretical figure. 
Smaller parties can acquire seats in this system， but acquiring a seat is more difficu1t for 
smaller parties than in the PR system. Therefore， the MMD system may be characterized 
as a"semi-proportional system." 
In the 1993 election， the last election that was executed under出issystem， the total 
number of Lower house members was 511 and there were 129 constituencies. Of the 129 
constituencies， two were 6・memberdistricts， 47 were 5・memberdis凶cts，33 were 4・
member dis位icts，39 were 3・memberdistricts， and eight were 2・memberdis仕icts.The 
larger parties， especially也eLDP， therefore ran multiple candidates in a district. As a 
result， the competition is between candidates of the same party in many constituencies. 
Table 4 presents a summ釘yof the 1990 election results. In this case， the LDP ran 
four candidates and the JSP ran two candidates. The four candidates from the LDP 
belonged to different factions. For the LDP， a party-centered campaign was diffic 
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Table 4 Results of the 1990 elections in the Yamanashi district 
Name Party Faction Votes Vote share 
Kanemaru Shin LDP Tekeshita 101，756 19.7 Elected 
Ueda Risei JSP 94，390 18.3 Elected 
Koshiishi Azuma JSP 80.311 15.5 Elected 
Nakao Eichi LDP Nakasone 77.282 15.0 Elected 
T anabe Kunio LDP Abe 75，412 14.6 Elected 
Horiuchi Mitsuo LDP Miyazawa 70，606 13.7 Not elected 
Asakura Shinsaku JCP 17，130 3.3 Not elected 
Source : The Asahi Shimbun，巴lectionreturns. 
③ Factionalism 
④ Absence of power altemation 
⑤ Increase in the number of parties in the parliament 
Power altemation had never occurred under the electoral system since the 1955 
system was established， sothe party system of Japan was c1assified as a dominant-party 
system by Giovanni Sartori (Sartori， 1977). Except for the 1958 election， the LDP ran 
candidates for a majority of the total seats. Therefore， toacquire power， non-LDP forces 
had to form coalitions， but they had never succeeded in designing a coalition govemment 
before the general elections. 
In the 1993 election， however， a power altemation occurred， and a coalition 
govemment of non-LDP forces was formed. Many parties participated in the coalition 
govemment. It was composed ofthe JSP， the 1RP (Japan Renewal Parりr)，the CGP (Clean 
Govemment Party， Komeito in Japan回e，)the刑 P(Japan New Party)， the SDL (Social 
Democratic League)， the DSP (Democratic Socialist Party) ， the NPH， and the DRL 
(Democratic Reform League). Three of the eight p訂ties，the JNP， JRP and NPH， were 
new parties that were established in 1992 or 1993. The prime minister of the coa1ition 
govemment was Morihiro Hosokawa who was the party leader of the JNP， which 
acquired thirty-five seats in the 1993 general election. 
In 1994， a new electoral system was introduced under the Hosokawa administration. 
The 511 members of the Lower house were reduced to 500. Of the 500， 300 were to be 
elected仕omsingle-member constituencies (SMP)， while 200 were to be elected by the 
proportional representation tier in 1 regional constituencies， according to the d、Hondt
system of calculation. Therefore， the proportion of e1ected members in the PR tIer was 40 
percent at first. The adoption of a mixed system was a product of compromise between a 
major pa此y(the LDP) and many minor parties. As was pointed out earlier， the party 
systems influence the electoral systems. We can say that the electoral reform in 1994 was 
such a case. 
The main purposes of the electoral reform were as fol1ows. 
① To shift丘omexpensive electoral campaigns to inexpensive campaigns. As a 
result， the amount of political corruptions would be reduced. 
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Table 5 AIlocation of seats to the 11 regions 
Regional bloc Seats Theoretical Baseline 
Hokkaido 8 1.1 
Tohoku 14 6.7 
Kita Kanto 20 4.8 
Minami Kanto 21 4.5 
Tokyo 17 5.6 
Hokuriku-Shin、etsu 1 8.3 
Tokai 21 4.5 
Kinki 30 3.2 
Chugoku 1 8.3 
Shikoku 6 14.3 
Kyusyu 21 4.5 
Total 180 
② To shift企omcandidate-centered campaigns to p紅ty-centeredcampaigns. As a 
result， elections would be more policy-based and voting behavior would shift from 
“candidate voting" to“party voting." 
③ To shi世froma dominant-party system to a two・partysystem. 
By the elections of 2000， the number of seats in the PR tier had been cut to 180， and 
therefore the total number of Lower house members had been cut to 480. Three hundred 
seats were elected by the SMD， and 180 seats were elected by the PR tier. There is no 
threshold in the PR. As we mentioned， there are eleven constituencies in the PR， 
Hokkaido， Tohoku， Kita Kanto， Minami Kanto， Tokyo， Tokai， Hokuriku-Shin'etsu， Kinki， 
Chugoku， Shikoku， and Kyusyu. We can thus say that there are 印刷althresholds in each 
constituency. 
Table 5 presents the allocation of seats to the 11 PR blocs and the theoretical 
baselines for gaining a seat since the 2000 election. In the Kinki bloc， the theoretical 
baseline is 3.2 percent， soit is relatively easy for smaller parties to gain a seat in the 
constituency. In contrast， it is difficult for smaller parties to gain a seat in the Shikoku 
region. On the whole， the possibility of tiny parties gaining seats in the new system is 
higher than that in the old system， intheory. 
Since the 2000 election， the proportion of elected seats in the PR tier has been 37.5 
percent and that in the SMD has been 62.5 percent. One of the aims of introducing the 
mixed system was to realize a two-party system and to enhance the possibility of power 
altemations. In fact， 1 think that the Japanese party system has effectively been a two-
party system since 2003. In the 2009 election， a power altemation企omthe LDP to the 
DPJ occurred. 
The Japanese electoral system allows dual candidacy as Germany does (see Table 1)， 
so the candidates who lose in the SMD tier may be able to acquire a seat in the PR tier. We 
call this“the Revival Win" (in Japanese，‘Fukkatsu Tosen') . The dual candidacy may 
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Figure 2 Seat share of top two parties， 1947・2009
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contribute to increasing the re-election rates of incumbents and to the existence of a 
multiple-members ofthe Diet in a SMD. In the case ofthe 2009 election， there were three 
constituencies that had three winners because of the dual candidacy system (the seventh 
district of Ibaraki， the eighth district of Saitama， and the first district of Kyoto). In 
addition， there are many constituencies that have two members of the Diet. 
3. Results 0/ the mixed system in Japan 
3.1. Toward a two-party system 
After the new electoral system was introduced in 1994， the Japanese party system 
gradually shifted from a multi-party system to a two-pa比ysystem. The new electoral 
system is a mixed system composed of a single-member district system and a proportional 
representation system. In the 1996 election， the total number of seats in the Lower House 
was 500. Three hundred members were elected in the SMD tier， and 200 members were 
elected in the PR tier. Since the 2000 election， the total number of Lower House members 
decreased from 500 to 480. The number of elected members in the SMD tier remained 
constant. The number ofPR-elected member was reduced from 200 to 180. As a result， the 
proportion of members in the SMD tier increased and the proportion of members in the PR 
tier decreased. Intheory， the reduction in the Lower House members put minor parties at a 
disadvantage. 
Figure 2 illustrates the sum of the seat share of the top two parties in the general 
elections from 1947 to 2009. From 1947 to 1955， before the 1955 system was established， 
the average seat share ofthe top two parties was 65 percent. In the 1958 election， the first 
general election after the 1955 system was established， the seat share increased sharply to 
97 percent. Ofthe 97 percent， 62 percent was for the LDP and 36 percent was for the JSP. 
From 1960 to 1979， the seat share ofthe top two parties declined gradually. In the 1979 
election， itwas approximately seven-tenths (69 percent). Gerald L. Curtis characterized 
this change as moving“From a two-pa口Yto a multi-party System"(Curtis 1999， 33-35). 
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The systemic factors for this change inv01ved the MMD system. As mentioned above， the 
MMD was a semi-proportiona1 e1ectora1 system， and maintaining the domination by two 
parties was difficult under this system. In the 1ate 1970s， there were those who said that the 
1955 system had already collapsed， however this judgment was prema旬re.The trend 
toward a multi-party system was halted in the 1980s. The average seat share ofthe top two 
parties企om1980 to 1990 was 76 percent. 
In the general election of 1993， immediate1y after血eLDP was split， the sum of the 
seat sh紅白ofthe top two parties plummeted企om80 to 57 percent， the 10west figure since 
1947. In this e1ection， a boom of new parties occurred. The sum of the seats acquired by 
three new parties， JNP， JRP and NPH， was over 100 seats. In addition， the number ofseats 
acquired by the JSP plummeted企om136 seats in 1990ω70， the lowest since the 1955 
system was established. After the mixed system was introduced in 1994， the tendency to 
move toward a two-pa勾 systemwas recognized. 
In September 2003， the Liberal Party， founded in 1998 by some offormer members 
of the NFP (the New Frontier Pa均， founded in December 1994 and dissolved in 
December 1997) ， merged into the DPJ. An influentia1 factor in the merger was the 
existence of the SMD in the electoral system. The SMD was thus successful in promoting 
two-party competition. After the merger， the average of the top two parties、tota1seat 
share in the next three elections was 87 percent. This percentage was the same level as the 
UK which has been recognized for a long time as a state with a typical two-party system 
(see Table 9 be10w). In the three British elections仕om1997 to 2005， the average seat 
share ofthe top two parties， the Labor and Conservative party， was 87 percent (calculated 
合omKavanagh and Cowley， 2010， 350・351).The year企om1993 to 2003 in Japan may 
be characterized as"the era of party realignment，"and we may cal it“the 2003 system" 
which is essentially a two-party system. We can say that one of the aims of electoral 
reform in 1994 was almost achieved in 2003. 
Tab1e 6 lists the sum of the seat shares of the two m吋orparties in the SMD and the 
PR tier separate1y. Since the 2003 election， the seat share of the top two parties in the 
SMD has been above 90 percent. In particu1ar， the seat share was 95 percent in the 1ast 
election. The prospect for smaller parties to win in the SMD was very small. However， the 
seat share of the top two p訂tiesin the PR has be 
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Table 6 Seat share of top two parties in the 
SMD and the PR， 1996・2009
year SMD PR Difference 
1996 88.3 65.0 23.3 
2000 85.7 57.2 28.4 
2003 91.0 78.3 12.7 
2005 90.3 76.7 13.7 
2009 95.0 78.9 16.1 
Source: Shugiin Jimukyoku (2009). 
Figure 3 Vote share of top two parties， 1947・2009
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result， one of the issues in the 1990 general election was to allocate administrative power 
between the LDP and the JSP， and voters were inclined to vote for one of the top two 
parties. However， the figure plummeted from 71 percent to 52 percent in the 1993 general 
election. Namely， approximately half ofvoters did not vote for either ofthe top two parties 
in that election 
As mentioned above， after the electoral system for the Lower House election 
replaced the MMD with the MMM， an important merging of parties occurred. In 
December 1994， the New Frontier Party was founded and the NFP had the status of 
second force in the Diet. The NFP was a merger of the JRP， the CGP， the JNP， and the 
DSP. In the 1996 election， the two major parties were the LDP and the NFP. The seat and 
vote shares of the topれνoparties were restored to the level seen before the 1993 election. 
As mentioned above， however， the NFP was dissolved in December 1994. 
In the 2000 general election， the LDP and the DPJ together shared 73 percent of the 
total seats. The total seat share of the two major parties increased to 85.4 percent in the 
2003 general election. That percentage was almost equal to that of the contemporary UK， 
which is characterized as a traditional two-party-system country. The total seats share of 
the two major parties was 85 percent in the 2005 election， and 89 percent in the 2009 
election. The main cause of the high percentage of the seat share held by the two major 
parties was the existence ofthe SMD tier. The seat share ofthe two major parties ofSMDs 
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Figure 4 The percentage of winners in the SMD gained les than 50% of 
the vote， 1996・2009
80.0 
60.0 
40.0 
28.7 
20.0 
0.0 
1996 2000 2003 2005 2009 
Source: The Yomiuri Shimbun election returns. 
in the 2009 election was extremely high (93.7 percent). 
From the viewpoint of the electoral system， the DPJ domination in the 2009 general 
election appears to be chiefly the effect of a sudden change in the SMDs. When a strong 
wind blows upon them， SMDs often experience either a leap or a great decrease in seats. 
For instance， it is often quoted that the Progressive Conservative Pa口yin Canada acquired 
169 seats， a working majority， inthe 1990 general election， but its share decreased sharply 
to only two seats in the 1993 general election. In Japan， sudden changes in the SMD 
occurred in 2005 and 2009. These phenomena indicate that the top two parties are almost 
equal in electoral strength. 
The vote share ofthe DPJ in the SMD tier was 47.4 percent and its seat share was 73. 
7 percent， sothe DPJ had representation 1.55 times in excess ofwhat it should have had. 
The vote share ofthe LDP in SMD's was 38.7 percent， and its seat share was 20.0 percent. 
The difference ofvote share between the DPJ and the LDP was 8.7 points. However， the 
difference in seat share reached 52.3 percent. In general， the top party takes advantage of 
SMD. In the 2005 general election， the LDP vote share was 48.4 percent， and its seat share 
was 73.0 percent. The LDP was thus over-represented by a factor of 1.51 times in 2005. 
This sudden change in SMDs was especially evident in urban areas because of the 
many floating voters there. For instance， inTokyo， the capital， the LDP won 23 ofthe 25 
districts in 2005， but it won only two districts in the 2009 election. In contrast， the DPJ 
won only one district in 2005， but it won 23 districts in 2009. 
Under the plurality systems， the requirement to be elected is to gain more votes than 
any other candidates. Candidates may therefore be elected with less than 50 percent ofthe 
vote at the district level. For a candidate elected with less than 50 percent of the vote， the 
sum of the wasted votes is more than the number of votes for the winner. In the first 
election under the new electoral system， about two-thirds of the winners in the SMD 
gained less than half of the total votes (Fig. 4). Among the winners in the SMD tier in that 
election， there was one candidate elected with only 21.5 percent of the vote (in the first 
district of Shizuoka). The percentage of candidates elected with a minority vote， however， 
had been gradually decreasing， reaching 28.7 percent in the 2009 election. The percentage 
of winners elected with a majority of the vote ha 
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number of the candidates from the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). The JCP ran for 
almost al districts企'Omthe 1996 to the 2003 general elections， but there were 275 JCP 
candidates in the SMD tier in the 2005 election and 152 in the 2009 election. The JCP only 
won two districts in the 1996 election， and it fai1ed to win any dis仕ictsince the 2000 
election. 
The main reason for this reduction in the 2005 and 2009 elections was the financial 
burden for the JCP. According to Japanese electoraI Iaw (in Japanese，‘Kosyoku Senkyo 
Ho ')， each candidate must pay a deposit to run (in Japanese， this deposit is called 
ゆotakukin'). For the Lower House election， each candidate must pay a deposit of 3 
mi1lion yen to run in a single-member constituency. Ifhe or she fails to gain more than 10 
percent ofthe tota1 votes， this deposit is forfeited. In fact， a majority ofthe JCP candidate8 
l08t this deposit in the 2003 and 2005 elections. In the 2003 election， 235 JCP candidates 
in the SMD 10st this deposit， and 223 candidates 10st it in the 2005 e1ection. These lost 
deposits of JCP candidates damaged the finances of the JCP， 80that it cou1d not avoid 
reducing the number of candidates in the SMD tier. As a result， the cut in the number of 
the JCP candidates in the SMDs con位ibutedto the evolution of a bipo1ar competition (the 
LDP versus the DPJ) and the reduction of wasted votes at the district level. 
While the sum ofthe seat shares ofthe top two parties had increased since the mixed 
system was introduced， the number ofparties in parliament was not reduced (Table 7). As 
already noted， it is easier for tiny parties to gain a seat in the new system than it was in the 
old system. As a result， the new system could not control party splitting and the formation 
of new parties. Sti1l， the effective number of parties has tended to decrease recently. The 
figure for 2009 (2.10) was the lowest since 1960. This figure is smaller than that of the 
2010 UK generaI clection‘(The effective number ofparties in the 2010 UK election was 
2.57.) We can therefore say that Japan is more of a two-pa均r-systemcountry than is the 
UK nowadays. The tendency toward a two-party system is recognized in regard to the 
effective number of parties. ln conclusion， the new electoral system did not reduce the 
number of parties in parliament， but brought to reduce the effective number of parties and 
movement toward a two-party system. 
The higher the disproportionality index， the greater the disproportionality. 
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SMDs had gradual1y decreased仕'Om1996 to 2009， the distortion between vote share and 
seat share in the SMDs was enhanced in the last two elections. These elections both 
resulted in landslide victories for one of the two major parties. The disproportionality in 
the SMD tier is especial1y high in an election in which one pa此ywins an overwhelming 
victory. We can say that the degree of disproportionality in the SMD tier of those two 
e1ections was at a fair1y high leve1 in comparison to the other SMP countries. In addition， 
the index of disproportionality also increased in the PR tier in the 2005 and 2009 elections. 
3.2 Decline 01 incumbent success 
As stated above， one of the aims of the electoral reform of 1994 was to engender a 
shift企omcandidate-centered election campaigns to party-centered campaigns. As a 
results， it was supposed that the criteria used for vote choice would shift企omcandidate to 
pa吋y.P町tyvoting has been broadly recognized as a characteristic ofBritish voters. We 
can therefore suppose that the SMD system promotes party voting. In the USA， however， 
candidate voting can be recognized in the Congressional elections. For instance， Cain， 
Ferejohn， and Fiorina introduced the concept of the“Personal Vote". They theorized that 
one cause ofthe incumbent advantage in US congressional elections was the personal vote 
(Cain， Ferejohn， and Fiorina 1987). 
Fi忠re5 plots the success rates of incumbents seeking re-election in the the general 
elections from 1969 through 2009. Generally speaking， the personal vote， orcandidate 
voting， has the potential to increase the re-election rates of incumbents， but at the same 
time， party voting has the potential to reduce that rate. In the MMD， the personal vote has 
the potential to reduce the re-election rate. In fact， exchanges of winners between the 
incumbent and the chal1enger or former representative have been occurred in the MMD 
due to candidate-centered campaigns. 
From 1979 to 1990， re-election rates were above 80 percent. Since the 1990s， though， 
parties split and realigned in Japan， sothe success rates ofincumbents has decreased since 
也e1993 election. The re-election rate of incumbents decreased somewhat under the new 
e1ectoral system企'Om 1996 to 2005， but the dual-candidacy system prevented a sharp 
decline in the re-election rate because a loser in the SMD tier could be re-elected in the PR 
tier. However， the rate declined sharply in the 2009 election mainly because many LDP 
incumbents could not retain their seats， not only in the SMD tier but also in the PR tier. 
4. A change in Japanese voting behavior 
In this section， we examine voting behavior by using public opinion data. We will use 
post-election survey data collected by Akarui-Senkyo・Suishin-Kyoukai(The Association 
For Promoting Fair Elections). 
One of the pu中osesof introducing the SMD was to bring about a sh出企om
candidate-centered campaigns to party-centered campaigns and from candidate voting to 
party voting， because candidate-centered electoral campaigns in multi-member 
constituencies are quite expensive. Since the 1996 general election， Japanese voters have 
cast two votes， one in the SMD tier and the other in the PR tier. In the SMD vote， voters 
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Table 7 Number of parties， effective number of parties. and level of disproportionalityb 
Number of parties in Effective number of level of 
year 
parliament disproportionality parties 
1947 5 3.99 3.91 
1949 9 2.77 9.53 
1952 7 3.06 3.42 
1953 7 3.87 3.70 
1955 6 3.68 4.04 
1958 3 1.98 3.58 
1960 4 2.00 6.23 
1963 4 2.15 5.15 
1967 5 2.41 6.46 
1969 5 2.50 9.02 
1972 5 2.68 7.00 
1976 6 3.20 7.44 
1979 7 3.31 3.99 
1980 7 2.74 6.57 
1983 7 3.24 4.25 
1986 7 2.58 7.17 
1990 7 2.71 6.73 
1993 9 4.20 6.35 
1996 7 2.94 10.65 
2000 9 3.17 10.66 
2003 8 2.59 8.14 
2005 8 2.27 16.11 
2009 9 2.10 16.23 
average in the MMD 6.11 2.95 5.81 
average in the Mixed 
8.20 2.61 12.36 
System 
a The Laakso/Taagepera index of the ef干'ectivenumber of parties‘ 
b The Gallagher index of disproportionality 
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Figure 5 Success rates of incumbents seeking reelection， 1969・2009
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Table 8 Criterion of vote choice， 1986・2009
1986 1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2005 2009 
Party (A) 45.1 51.2 40.6 43.4 46.1 47.0 50.3 61.2 
42.5 37.3 49.1 43.8 42.8 36.5 35.0 29.0 
Candidate (8) 
(A)一(8) 2.6 13.9 -8.5 一0.4 3.3 10.5 15.3 32.2 
Source ; Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai Post Election Pols. 
write in a candidate' s name， and in the PR vote， voters write in a pa口yname. In the old 
system (MMD)， voters casted a single vote by writing in a candidate's name. 
Table 8 presents the transition of the criterion for vote choice in the MMD and the 
SMD in the last eight general elections. Of these eight elections， the first three were 
executed by the MMD， and the last five， by the mixed system. In this survey， there is a 
question regarding the criterion for voting. According to the response to this question， 
respondents were classified as “party voters" or “candidate voters." In general， the nurnber 
of party voters and that of candidate voters were almost equal under the old system， but in 
the 1990 election the proportion of party voters was much greater than that of candidate 
voters. One of the characteristics of the 1990 election was the renewed competition 
between the LDP and the JSP. The JSP had won the 1989 Upper House election， and in the 
1990 general election it substantially increased the number of acquired seats. We can say 
that stif competition between two major parties promotes to the party voting. 
In the 1996 election， the first election under the new electoral system， 43.4 percent of 
the respondents attached greater importance to a party rather than to a candidate. That 
proportion gradually increased after the 1996 election. Ina 2005 post-election poll， half of 
the voters were pa此yvoters. In the 2009 poll， that proportion great1y increased. At the 
same time， the percentage of voters who attached greater importance to a candidate than to 
a pa口ygradually decreased after the new electoral system was introduced 
The proportion of candidate voters was 43.8 percent in the 1996 poll， but this 
dropped to below 30 percent in the 2009 poll. In contrast， while the proportion of pa此y
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voters was almost equal to that of candidate voter in the 1996 poll， the proportion of party 
voters was同ricethat of candidate voters in the 2009 poll. It can be supposed that changes 
in the voting criterion brought about a decline in the success rate of incumbents (Fig.5)， 
because the incumbents' advantage in elections was a result of candidate or personal 
votmg. 
As was pointed out， one ofthe aims ofthe electoral reform of 1994 was to encourage 
a shift仕omcandidate voting to party voting， because under the old electoral system (the 
MMD)， candidate幽centeredcampaigns and candidate voting led to expensive electoral 
campaigns and political corruption. According to the polls， one of the aims of electoral 
reform was in fact accomplished in the 2009 election. The change in Japanese voting 
behavior was one cause of the power altemation in the 2009 election. 
5. Summary and conc/usion 
In this paper， we examined the relationship between electoral systems and election 
results. In the last two decades， the number of countries that have adopted mixed-member 
electoral systems has been increasing， so we can say that the mixed system is the 
worldwide fashion at present. Japan is one of these cases， having introduced a mixed 
system in 1994. To examine the consequences of electoral reforms in Japan is， therefore， a 
meaningful task for evaluating the effect of mixed systems on p町tysystems. The 
consequences of introducing a mixed system in Japan were as follows. 
(1) The existence of SMD in the mixed system promoted competition between two major 
parties. As a result， a trend toward a two四partysystem has occuηed in recent J apan. 
(2) The number of parties in the parliament was not reduced， and the number of smaller 
parties increa日ed.The mixed system therefore did not promote a reduction in the 
number of parties in the parliament. However， the new system did contribute to 
reducing the effective number of parties. 
(3) The percentage of candidates elected with a minority vote in the SMD tier decreased. 
The SMD system therefore promoted bipolar competitions in Japan. 
(4) Japanese voting behavior became more party-based in the recent elections， especially 
in the 2009 election. The increase of party voting contributed to the power altemation 
that occurred in 2009. 
(5) The success rate of incumbents seeking re聞electionwas reduced under the new 
electoral system. It thus became more difficult for Lower House members to attain 
successlve wms. 
We can say that the aims of the electoral reform of the 1990s were almost 
accomplished， asa whole. Stil， we cannot avoid observing that the new electoral system 
did not bring stabi1ty to Japanese politics. Rather， the increase in the possibility ofpower 
altemation under the new electoral system might be a factor promoting govemmental 
instabi1ity. The probabi1ty of sudden changes in the SMD tier heightened the impact of 
the approval rating for the cabinet at that specific time on the electoral result. In fact， a 
change of Japanese prime ministers occurred every year企om2006 to 2011. It is broadly 
asserted that one of the advantages of a two-party system is govemment stabilityヲbutthe
J apanese party system has tr加 sitioned仕oma dominant-pa町rsystem or a multi-party 
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system to an“unstable" two・pぽtysystem. 
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